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Abstract Much of the recent fisheries economics literature promotes usufruc-
tuary rights policies to lessen the dissipation of resource rents. However, this
literature does not count institutional inefficiencies which result from rent-
seeking and the principal-agent problem when a centralized government con-
trols access to renewable ocean resources. As a result, the efficiency of usu-
fructuary rights programs, including ITQs, throughout the economy could be
exaggerated. From a dynamic standpoint, though, usufructuary rights policies
remain an important avenue for residual claimants to contract for less atten-
uated institutions of common or private property rights. These conclusions are
drawn from a survey of the property rights and public choice literatures.
Keywords U.S. fisheries, fisheries management, open access, common pool
resources, property rights, economic efficiency, rent-seeking, principal-agent
problem, common property, self-governance, private property.
Rather than attempting to find "optimal" solutions to economic problems,
[economists] should concentrate on finding good decision rules, which all
individuals and interest groups will find in their own long-run interest to
adopt for the solution of still unidentified conflicts over resource allocation.
Sandmo (1990: 52)
Introduction
Gordon's (1954) seminal work on dissipation of resource rents in non-exclusive
fisheries spawned an as yet unresolved debate about which form of ownership—
"a cooperative, a government board, a private corporation, or an international
authority" (Scott 1955: 116)—would best manage renewable ocean resources for
society. Cheung (1970) appeared to prefer private ownership of fish resources
because the transactions costs of contracting resource use most likely would be
less if carried out by the private sector than by government. However, Copes
(1972: 160) reported that "[m]anagement of a fishery by a regime of private sole
ownership is generally non-optimal from a social standpoint [when compared to
government regulation] and is not inherently superior to unlimited entry." In
contrast, although not dealing exclusively with economic efficiency, Ciriacy-
Wantrup and Bishop (1975) argued the case of collective ownership of common
pool resources such as fish stocks.
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Guilio Pontecorvo, Sam Pooley, Bruce Rettig, Jason Shogren, and John Walden at various
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Although not overlooked, my impression is that much ofthe subsequent eco-
nomics literature on fisheries management set aside this debate and focused on the
immediate problem of steering government towards optimum tax or quota poli-
cies, such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs), for exploiting renewable ocean
resources within its territorial seas or extended fisheries management zones
(Anderson 1977; Crutchfield 1961; Crutchfield and Pontecorvo 1969; Neher et al.
1989; Pearse 1980; Rettig and Ginter 1978). Nevertheless, we have been reminded
from time to time of the unresolved debate. Scott (1979) drew attention to the
relevance of early economics theories of regulation and public choice to fisheries
management, and later he fit fishing rights into a more general taxa of property
rights (Scott 1988). Pearse (1980) also considered the nature of property rights in
fisheries, particularly with regards to the infiuence of exclusivity on transactions
costs and choice of government regulation, while Wilson (1990) examined the
implications of open access for producing and sharing knowledge ofthe resource.
Cross (1979) showed how a collective of fishermen might appropriate scarcity
retlts by affecting a change in property rights which excludes other fishermen from
the fishery, provided that expected benefits outweigh the costs of exclusion and
enforcement. However, Johnson and Libecap (1982) hypothesized that common
pool losses persist in fisheries because of both political opposition to private
territorial rights and the high costs of contracting among heterogeneous claimants.
Finally, Karpoff (1987) explained that traditional fisheries regulations result from
rational maximizing behavior of less efficient fishermen who exploit the political
process for redistributive gains, and Scott (1993) pondered the effects of distri-
bution on self-governance.
This paper merely offers a further synthesis of the property rights, public
choice, and fisheries management literatures already begun by the above econo-
mists. I hope to draw more attention to comparisons of alternative property rights
institutions by discussing a broad range of inefficiencies inherent to state owner-
ship and by highlighting the possibility of common or private ownership in tech-
nologically advanced countries such as the United States.
The nexus of property rights and behavior and its relationship to ocean fish-
eries is presented next, followed by a summary of the public choice view of
government. Subsequent sections discuss theoretical and empirical aspects of
common ownership and private ownership. In the final section, I conclude that
the opportunity costs of state usufructuary rights policies, such as limited entry
and ITQs, have been underestimated, but that these policies could beget more
efficient forms of common or private ownership. Throughout, the focus is on how
property rights institutions are likely to affect economic efficiency (hereafter,
efficiency) by influencing the behavior of individual decision-makers—e.g., a
commercial or recreational fisherman, an environmentalist, an agency head, or a
politician—i.e., on "good decision rules" as recommended in the introductory
quote from Sandmo (1990: 52).
Property, Property Rights, and Property Rights Institutions
Bromley (1992: 2) stresses that property is not a physical object; "[p]roperty is a
benefit (or income) stream, and a property right is a claim to the benefit stream
that some higher body—usually a government—will agree to protect through the
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benefit stream." Accordingly, property involves an institution, or a "social de-
cision system that providels] rules for adjusting and accommodating, over time,
conflicting demands . . . from different interest groups in a society" (Ciriacy-
Wantrup and Bishop 1975: 714).
A complete bundle of property rights to an asset consists of the rights "to use
it [or not use it], to change its form and substance, and to transfer all rights
through, e.g., sale, or some rights through, e.g., rental" (Furubotn and Pejovich
1972: 1140). Such rights promote efficiency because they are well-defined to min-
imize uncertainty, divisible to take advantage of the range of possible simulta-
neous or sequential uses, exclusive of other users to control free-riding and en-
courage rational use, investment, and innovation, alienable to facilitate transfer to
the highest valued use(s), and enforced. Yet, few, if any, property rights are not
attenuated to some degree. Restrictions might be legal in nature, possibly to
protect the public's safety, such as speed limits and residential zoning. Property
rights are also attenuated because most commodities have some attributes which
are too costly to measure, police, enforce, or exchange, thereby making part of
the potential rents a residual (Barzel 1989; Cheung 1970).
As noted above, institutions serve the economic purpose of allocating scarce
resources, but, "[b]y defining the parameters for the use of scarce resources and
assigning the associated rewards and costs, the prevailing system of property
rights [also] establishes incentives and time horizons for investment, production,
and exchange" (Libecap 1986: 227), thereby affecting efficiency. Property rights
both establish the potential capitalized value of an object (Demsetz 1964) and,
with associated transaction costs and legal barriers, constrain choices (De Alessi
1980; Furubotn and Pejovich 1972). Absent the right or ability to exclude, a
usufructuary right—i.e., "the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits
of something belonging to another" (Webster New collegiate Dictionary)—alone
provides comparatively little incentive to conserve because free-riding prevents
users from fully capitalizing their actions into market prices (Alchian and Demsetz
1973; De Alessi 1980) and because the owner, possibly government, might expro-
priate or not renew the rights (Anderson and Hill 1975). Furthermore, without
transfer, owners of exclusive rights lack incentive to consider valuations by oth-
ers, including the expected demand of future generations, thereby constraining
efficiency and encouraging too rapid use (Alchian and Demsetz 1973; Demsetz
1964).
The property rights taxa reported by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) matches
property rights with incentives faced by residual claimants who exploit natural
resources. Although intended to classify collectives, their taxa is applied here to
ownership in general. Specifically, access and harvest are usufructuary rights as
exemplified by limited entry licenses and ITQs, respectively, in government-
regulated and collective fisheries. More extensive is the right to manage a re-
source which allows determination of use patterns and improvements. Of interest
is the evolution of stock enhancement, research, and policing activities by fish-
ermen in some ITQ fisheries (Pearse and Walters 1992; Scott 1993), although these
fishermen do not own de jure management rights per se. As noted above, how-
ever, without the additional right to exclude people from one's asset—i.e., to
determine who has usufructuary rights and whether or how these rights may be
transferred—the future benefits of restraint, investment, and innovation are at
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the world own exclusion rights to fishing grounds {e.g., Agnello and Donnelley
1979; Dyer and Leard 1992; Ruddle et al., 1992). Finally, alienation is the right to
sell or lease—i.e., transfer—exclusion and management rights. Alienation is es-
seijtial to fully capitalize the future value of an asset, and it moves resources to
their most economically valued uses.
Given the range of property rights and related behavioral incentives, the
phrase, sole ownership, is too ambiguous for analytical purposes. Instead, a ru-
dimentary ownership taxonomy from the literature on exploitation of common
pool resources will be used here.' Accordingly, government-sponsored license
limitation, ITQs, and other usufructuary rights policies are parts of government
institutions which are overseen by a politically organized body of a country—
hereafter called state ownership. That is, the state exercises ownership of renew-
able ocean resources on behalf of the general public, but it may allocate private
usufructuary rights to harvesters. However, management, exclusion, and alien-
ation are separated from actual use in state ownership. In contrast, in a common
ownership institution—not to be confused with Garret Hardin's "tragedy of the
coiiimons"^—ownership of rights is held in common, such as by individuals in a
kinship group, a local community, or a marketing cooperative. Finally, an indi-
vidual entity owns the rights to manage, exclude, and alienate property rights in
a private ownership institution. The owner could be a commercial fisherman or
corporation, a charter boat enterprise, a sport fishing club, a conservation orga-
nization, an oil company, and so on.
The next three sections discuss state, common, and private ownership of
natiiral resources from the standpoint of how residual claimants and government
stakeholders (especially managers, agency heads, and politicians) behave.^ I be-
gin with state ownership in which the attenuation of property rights constrains
harvesters and provides government stakeholders with opportunities to pursue
personal utility.
State Ownership
State usufructuary rights—In the United States, ownership of renewable ocean
resources was impractical until Congress enacted the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 (FCMA), thereafter sharply restricting foreign fishing
within 200 miles of the coast. Contrary to vast public holdings of forests, grazing
land, and petroleum resources, however, the federal government practiced ex-
clusion in only two ocean fisheries until this decade—limited entry in both the surf
clam and ocean quahog fishery and the purse seine component of the Atlantic
bluefin tuna fishery. Instead, the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils
(Councils) established by the FCMA, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), and Congress regulated catch and fishing effort in otherwise open access
fisheries. However, harvest from 42% of the nation's fish resources for which data
are available dropped below long term potential yield since 1976 (NOAA 1991). In
' See Acheson (1989), Bromley (1992), and Ostrom (1987).
^ Acheson (1989) discusses the differences between true common property and Hardin's
metaphor.
' A residual claimant seeks to benefit financially from use of a non-exclusive resource
(e.g., fish resource) or economic policy (e.g., tariff or monopoly power) which is controlled
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fact, the trend has been for overutilized fish resources to become even more
depleted {e.g., Atlantic cod and other groundfish), for fully-utilized resources to
become overutilized {e.g., Atlantic sea scallops), and for previously underutilized
resources to become fully-utilized {e.g., Alaskan groundfish).
The 1990s appear to mark a change in U.S. fisheries policy from open access
to state usufructuary rights policies, however."* At the time of this writing, the
Councils implemented usufructuary rights in five of 32 federally managed fisher-
ies—three plans with license limitation, and ITQs in the Atlantic surf clam and
ocean quahog fishery and the South Atlantic wreckfish fishery. In addition, ITQs
will be implemented in 1995 in Alaska's Pacific halibut and sablefish fisheries.
Thus, there appears to be momentum for usufructuary rights in U.S. federal
waters as well as in New Zealand, Canada, Iceland, and Australia.^
The economic waste which accompanies open access fishing is generally ac-
knowledged by the fishery management community; but will state ownership of
renewable ocean resources actually increase efficiency throughout the economy?
Clearly, fish resources become valuable in state usufructuary rights fisheries,
judging from the sale of licenses and harvest quotas (Townsend 1990). There is
also ample evidence of gains in a fieet's technical efficiency from retirement of
excess capital in ITQ fisheries {e.g., Gauvin et al. 1994 and NOAA 1992). Nev-
ertheless, economical use of usufructuary rights and fishing capital is insufficient
evidence of gains in efficiency throughout government and the economy. Indeed,
economists have reported considerable waste from state ownership of grazing
lands, energy resources, forests, and water supplies resulting from residual claim-
ant behavior and the actions of government stakeholders {e.g., Gardner 1983;
Libecap 1989; Stroup and Baden 1983; Wahl 1989). Therefore, one must also ask
whether the total opportunity costs of state ownership and government regulation
outweigh gains in the fishery.
Government failure—"Government failure", or, more generally, non-market
failure, refers to the inability or disinclination of government stakeholders to
produce, regulate, manage, or monitor the production of goods and services ef-
ficiently (Wolf 1988). Thus, as for markets, the state is being compared to an
impossible standard of a hypothetical, purely competitive economic system which
is characterized in part by zero transactions costs and completely unattenuated
property rights to all resources. However, unlike market failure which is usually
attributed to non-exclusiveness, non-rivalry, or interdependence among individ-
ual utility and/or technological production functions, government failure arises
because it is difficult to define or quantify a commodity, demand is not known, a
lack of competition inhibits accountability and innovation, or government stake-
holders are able to gain pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources of income (Wolf
1988). In this paper, I am particularly interested in what public choice theory says
about the last two sources of government failure because they address the sepa-
ration of ownership of renewable ocean resources by citizens, management by
government stakeholders, and use (or nonuse, e.g., species preservation) by re-
sidual claimants, all of whom face different property rights and, therefore, behav-
ioral incentives. Specifically at issue are rent-seeking, the economic theory of
regulation, and the principal-agent problem.
'^ This information was provided by Andy Rosenberg of the NMFS.
' See Townsend (1990) for a survey of controlled access programs around the world.258 S. F. Edwards
Rent-seeking, or using scarce resources to appropriate an economic rent cre-
ated by the state, is characteristic of firms seeking state-sponsored advantage as
a means to increase profits (Buchanan et al. 1980; Krueger 1974; TuUock 1967).
Rent-seeking is costly for society, though, because the resources used to acquire
monopoly power, tariffs, subsidies, franchises or other artificial advantage over
competitors are not productive. At the same time, competitors, including con-
surtier organizations, are obliged to spend resources to protect themselves, the
state spends resources to address all concerns, and the process continues ad
infinitum as claimants seek to modify or protect positions.
Rent-seeking also occurs when residual claimants spend resources to acquire
subsidies or privileged access to or allocations of common pool natural resources
froin the state, thereby dissipating resource rents. Rent-seeking has been thor-
oughly documented for use of U.S. holdings of hard minerals (Libecap 1978;
Unjibeck 1977), forests (Deacon and Johnson 1985), water (Anderson 1983; Wahl
1989), oil and gas (Libecap and Wiggins 1985; Mean et al. 1985), and grazing land
(Anderson and Hill 1975; Libecap 1981). Rent-seeking also characterizes state-
owned fisheries as numerous and heterogeneous residual claimants vie for the
potentially substantial resource rents (Johnson and Libecap 1982; Karpoff 1987).
Disputes within and among groups of commercial fishermen (distinguished by port
and gear), recreational fishermen, native peoples, and environmentalists over
renewable ocean resources take place daily and involve numerous meetings with
politicians and fishery managers and considerable—but, to my knowledge, un-
measured—expenses for lobbyists, lawyers, and consultants. For example, after
over 10 years of concerted effort, the sport fishing industry gained exclusive use
of niost billfish species in the U.S. Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico in 1988
froni east coast Councils; other gamefish species in the east—e.g., sharks, striped
bass, and Atlantic bluefin tuna—are being sought with equal zeal by commercial
fishermen, sport fishermen, and environmentalists. On the west coast, allocation
of valuable Alaskan groundfish quota between offshore and inshore claimants was
recently settled in court for now, but the four-year battle heavily involved NMFS,
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, Alaskan politicians, industry
associations, lobbyists, consultants, and lawyers as well as the court (Herrick et
al., n.d.). Rent-seeking does not end with court decisions or with establishment of
exclusive licenses or ITQs, however. Owners of state usufructuary rights still
battle over catch limits and effort restrictions, and those not receiving rights seek
access (Hide and Ackroyd 1990). Indeed, in the United States, Councils state that
exclusive usufructuary policies, such as moratoria or ITQs, are indefinite.^ Rent-
seeking in state-controlled fisheries is ubiquitous and continuous.
Another consequence of rent-seeking—other than the its opportunity costs—is
that the state often takes actions which benefit the very industries it is supposed
to regulate, at the expense of consumers or taxpayers (Jordan 1972). Thus, it is not
surprising when the state chooses standards or input controls rather than the
economists' preferred Pigovian taxes (Buchanan and Tullock 1975). In the ex-
treme, a regulatory agency might be captured by industry (Stigler 1971). Producer
protection or capture occurs because of political influence, superior technical
* See Gauvin et al (1994) for the possibility in the south Atlantic wreckfish fishery. In the
Northeast Region, amendments to the Atlantic groundfish and sea scallops plans propose
moratoria that may be ended if the stocks recover.Ownership of Ocean Resources 259
knowledge which the regulatory agency requires, appointees being selected from
the regulated industry or the possibility of future employment in that industry, or
the agency's need for recognition and informal cooperation from the industry
when dealing with Congress or the Executive Branch.
The actions of fisheries managers and other government stakeholders are con-
sistent with the producers protection hypothesis. The FCMA's exclusion of for-
eign fishermen from U.S. waters was noted above, but the FCMA also favors joint
ventures over directed foreign fishing which would yield resource rents for the
nation from some resources. Furthermore, Congress has passed a number of acts
throughout this century which subsidize vessel construction and insurance in
open access fisheries.
In contrast to the producer protection theory of regulation which does not
explicitly deal with their motivations, principal-agent theory addresses the pref-
erences and decisions of government stakeholders. Also originally developed as
part of a theory of market production, the principal-agent problem occurs when
interests differ among principals {i.e., owners), who desire income from their
investment, and managers, who perform as agents for owners but who are further
interested in personal income and utility (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972; Williamson
1963). High transaction costs caused by dispersed ownership and, where it ap-
plies, government regulation of profit or production attenuate the rights of owners
and, thereby, provide managers with opportunities to pursue personal benefits,
including non-pecuniary income such as travel, plush offices, and large, congenial
staffs (Alchian and Kessel 1962; De Alessi 1969). Furthermore, under these cir-
cumstances, which can be exacerbated by a lack of competition (Boardman and
Vining 1989), managers are less inclined to oversee employees who, in turn,
engage in shirking (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; De Alessi 1980).
Although operating in the private sector—particularly in industries regulated
by the state—the principal-agent problem is believed to be most severe in gov-
ernment because ownership of government agencies and state enterprises is non-
transferable (De Alessi 1969, 1980) and because the output of many government
agencies is a mixture of intangible services which are difficult to quantify or
evaluate (Jordan 1972; Zeckhauser and Horn 1989).^ Consequently, taxpayers
have less incentive to oversee government stakeholders than stockholders have to
oversee corporate managers, and, unlike private sector managers, government
stakeholders are rarely rewarded for efficiency nor penalized for inefficiency.
Furthermore, state enterprises and government agencies often have monopolies in
output markets or in their regulatory purviews (De Alessi 1983). Indeed, Niska-
nen's (1968) seminal analysis of non-market decision making illustrated how "util-
ity-maximizing bureaucrats," behaving like price discriminating monopolists,
might maximize their agency's budgets and increase factor surpluses {i.e., sur-
pluses to businesses and labor—including themselves—which supply goods and
services to the agency) at a net loss of economic surplus from society, including
a total loss of consumers' surplus. In contrast, in the private sector, the principal-
agent problem is thought to be limited by the ability of owners to sell their hold-
^ See Niskanen (1989) for comments on the severity of principal-agent problem in govern-
ment. State enterprises, such as the U.S. Postal Service, Amtrak, and the Tennessee
Valley Authority, sell goods and services to the public. National defense, V.A. hospital
care, multiple-use parks, species preservation, and biological diversity are examples of
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ings, by competition for positions within the firm or in other firms, and by pecu-
niary rewards based on performance (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Crain and Zard-
koohi 1980; De Alessi 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich 1972).
The empirical evidence supports principal-agent theory, although not without
exception. Based on reviews of several state enterprises and regulated industries
in utilities, banking, and transportation, De Alessi (1980, 1983) found the range of
inefficiencies outlined above to be worse in government—i.e., state enterprises
had higher unit operating costs, produced lower quality and lesser variety of
output, were slower to adopt cost-minimizing input combinations and to introduce
cost-reducing innovations, and invested less in research and development. Simi-
larly, Boardman and Vining (1989), who controlled for government regulation and
market power in their empirical work, reported state enterprises to be less pro-
ductive and profitable than either regulated or unregulated firms in comparable
industries. There is also evidence from New Zealand's Forest Service and State
Coal Mines that government agencies are less efficient than even state enterprises
(Zeckhauser and Horn 1989).
Studies of natural resource agencies in the United States also report much
evidence consistent with the principal-agent problem and Niskanen's "utility-
maximizing bureaucrat" {e.g., Anderson and Leal 1991; Deacon and Johnson
1985; Gardner 1983; Stroup and Baden 1983), including in fisheries {e.g., Johnson
and Libecap 1982). In fact, government agencies have, at times, intentionally
undercut efforts by residual claimants to manage state-owned natural resources in
order to reclaim authority {e.g., Anderson and Hill 1975; Higgs 1982; Johnson
1985; Libecap 1981, 1985; Rucker and Fishback 1983); at other times, professional
goals appear paramount, such as when the Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management undermined oil production on public forest and grazing lands, re-
spectively (Libecap 1985). Also, antitrust legislation was used during the 1940s
and 1950s to bust fishermen's unions and trade associations in the Gulf of Mexico
shrimp fishery (Johnson and Libecap 1982), even though the federal government
coridoned the cartel policies of small oil producers during the same period
(Libecap 1986).
It is interesting, though, that the behaviors just described have been cast in a
positive light where co-management is involved. Co-management is the process
whereby residual claimants are empowered by the state to manage use of common
pool resources, while the state sets guidelines or restrictions {e.g., total allowable
catch or illegal gears) and provides enforcement (Hanna 1990; Pinkerton 1992).
Coimanagement is weakened by internal confiicts and disputes which arise among
heterogeneous claimants, however (McCay 1988; Pinkerton 1987, 1988). The state
can also undermine co-management by denying the right of exclusion, as in Can-
ada's Bay of Fundy herring fishery.^ Nevertheless, co-management has sustained
use of common pool resources and, apparently, reduced rent-seeking, including in
marine fisheries (Asada 1973; Hanna 1990: Jentoft 1989; Pinkerton 1988). Fur-
thermore, by authorizing residuals claimants to make resource management de-
cisions, co-management probably is more likely that centralized government reg-
ulation to preserve part of the potential resource rents (Anderson and Hill 1983).^
In summary, state ownership is vulnerable to special-interest groups of resid-
* See Jentoft (1989: 141) for a brief discussion and unpublished reference.
' Se,e Dyer and Laird (1992) and Wilson (1977) for examples in fisheries.Ownership of Ocean Resources 261
ual claimants and to self-interest of government stakeholders. With no clear re-
sidual claimant, politicians responding to re-election pressures, and agency heads
and the general workforce capitalizing on the principal-agent problem, it is argu-
able how much usufructuary policies alone will preserve resource rents. Further-
more, rent-seeking expends untold resources on attempts to influence government
allocations and subsidies. These costs—i.e., agency loss and rent-seeking—
augment the use of labor and capital in fisheries research, management, and
enforcement and the disappointing performance of some state usufructuary rights
fisheries (Squires and Kirkley 1993; Wilen 1989). Co-management might offer
cost-savings because residual claimants, who internalize benefits and costs, de-
termine at least part of management policy, but the objectives of government
stakeholders can still be salient, and the transaction costs of contracting can be
great in a heterogeneous, market-based, rent-seeking society such as the United
States.
Common Ownership, or Self-Governance'"
Garret Hardin, in his controversial metaphor of the "tragedy of the commons,""
offered only government regulation or private enterprise as possible solutions to
overexploitation of common pool natural resources. In reality, though, common
property institutions have managed natural resources on a sustainable yield basis
throughout the world since pre-history (Berkes 1989; McCay and Acheson 1987;
Ostrom 1990; Rushkin 1986), including renewable ocean resources {e.g., Acheson
1989; Asada 1973; Berkes 1985; Christy 1982). The very regulations that coastal
states now attempt to impose on fishermen who do not share or own management,
exclusion, or alienable rights (e.g., minimum fish size, closed seasons or areas,
gear restrictions, and limited entry) have long been part of self-governance re-
gimes (Acheson 1989; Johannes 1978; McGoodwin 1990).
The United States does not have to look far for examples of self-governance.
Before Europeans discovered North America, native Indians were collectively
managing wildlife, such as fur-bearing animals (Demsetz 1967) and salmon
(Pinkerton 1988). Later in U.S. history, mining camps, claims associations, and
livestock boards emerged throughout the West to limit access to "disposed"
federal lands and to enforce the collectives' rules (Anderson and Hill 1975;
Libecap 1989; Stroup and Baden 1983). Oil producers sometimes contract to
economize production from a common oil pool, a process called unitization
(Libecap and Wiggins 1985). Regarding fisheries, small communities surrounding
some of Maine's ports have controlled access to nearby lobster grounds for some
time (Acheson 1977). Community management also has been practiced since the
mid-1800s in Louisiana's Gulf of Mexico where kinship determines exclusive use
of oyster beds (Dyer and Leard 1992). Gulf of Mexico shrimper unions and trade
associations limited entry and negotiated price agreements with packaging houses
(Durrenberger 1992; Johnson and Libecap 1982). Finally, McCay (1980) described
a cooperative of whiting fishermen in the New York Bight area which began to
'° Anthony Scott recently reviewed the literature on self-governance (Scott 1993); there-
fore, my account is brief.
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influence landings prices during the 1950s by limiting entry and actually assigning
quotas to individual vessels.
Begging forgiveness from epistemologists, these and the many other examples
of common ownership might be classified as either community management or
marketing cooperatives. As used here, community management would stem from
kinship, tradition, or a shared culture or ethnicity, and the overall community
being defined, in large part, by their dependence on fish resources (Durrenberger
1992; Dyer and Leard 1992). Although a marketing cooperative is sometimes part
of a fishing community—e.g., Barra's shellfish marketing company on the remote
Western Isles of Scotland (Prattis 1987)—it is distinguished from community man-
agement by integration with markets. However, unlike many traditional fishing
communities (e.g.. Ruddle et al. 1992), cooperatives often lack exclusive use
rights {e.g., Berkes 1986; Durrenberger and Palsson 1987; McCay 1980).
Clearly, there is a history of self-governance of use of natural resources, but
"[c]an common ownership of resources perform well in a market economy?"
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975: 718). Yes, at times, particularly when a small,
culturally homogeneous group has exclusive control of the resource, and its eco-
nomic activity is embedded in the community (Berkes 1986; Dyer and Leard
1992). Perhaps more to the point, a small, homogeneous group is more inclined to
share information required for management and enforcement, and conflicts which
arise from an inequitable distribution of wealth are less prevalent and, when they
occur, less costly to resolve (Scott 1993).
Situations which seem to meet these conditions are common. Sustainable,
common use of forests, grazing lands, and water supplies in remote peasant farm-
ing villages of Switzerland and Japan are often cited (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
1975). In fisheries, these conditions characterize some oyster fisheries in Louisi-
ana's Gulf of Mexico (Dyer and Leard 1992) and the Fal River in England (Cove
1973), lagoon and coastal fisheries in the Solomon Islands (Ruddle et al. 1992), the
coastal fishing rights fisheries for shellfish and seaweed in Japan (Asada 1973;
Ruddle 1989), the southern seas pelagic fisheries in Turkey (Berkes 1986), and
some salmon fisheries conducted by native Indians in North America (Pinkerton
1988).
Yet, community management often succumbs to market forces. In Great Brit-
ain, for example, technological advances in planting row crops and increases in
the price of sheep's wool prompted feudal lords to exclude peasant farmers and
ranchers from the commons, with considerable assistance from the state (Hanna
19S|0). Similarly, on the European continent, common forests previously used for
grazing, firewood, and building materials by the peasantry were enclosed by
feudal lords after the value of timber rose (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975).
These examples illustrate a tendency for higher prices and technological change to
initiate more precise definitions of property rights (Anderson and Hill 1975; Dem-
setz 1967).
Marketing cooperatives would benefit from the same homogeneity and small-
ness of traditional fishing communities {e.g., Prattis 1987). Furthermore, given
their economic purpose, cooperatives appear better able to function in market
economies. Notable are the whiting cooperative mentioned earlier which used
limited entry and individual vessel quotas (McCay 1980) and the producer orga-
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1989). Nevertheless, cooperatives, too, can be vulnerable to market forces, par-
ticularly cooperatives which lack exclusive rights to resources. For example, a
porgy cooperative in New Jersey dissolved after both introduction of purse seine
gear and increases in the price of porgies relative to menhaden spurred entry and
eventual depletion ofthe stocks (McCay 1987). Similarly, despite the presence of
cooperatives, fish resources have been depleted in parts of Turkey where nearby
urban demand for fish is strong, the state opposes limited entry, and fishermen
from different gear-oriented cooperatives compete with each other, sport fisher-
men, and the tourism industry (Berkes 1986). Also, it is notable that the New York
Bight whiting cooperative failed in numerous attempts to organize other whiting
fishermen because its safe access to fishing grounds during times of bad weather
and high landings prices created an insurmountable distributional issue (McCay
1980).
At least three conclusions can be drawn from this brief review of the common
property literature. First, exclusion is essential to a common property institu-
tion.'^ When possessing either de facto or de jure ownership, residual claimants
are sometimes able to control access to and exploitation of common pool re-
sources, thereby capitalizing on expected future benefits from restraint, invest-
ment, and innovation.'^ Also, self-governance should be much less costly than
external, centralized government regulation because residual claimants have
greater incentive to internalize benefits and costs (Anderson and Hill 1983).
Second, common property institutions are more able than the state to respond
to changes in the resource (Jentoft 1989; Ruddle et al. 1992) and, I would stress,
markets as illustrated in the Barra, Scotland lobster fishery (Prattis 1987). In
contrast, real-time flexibility is not a feature of centralized state ownership re-
gimes.
Finally, the costs of monitoring and enforcing non-binding agreements among
heterogeneous claimants probably precludes community management of renew-
able ocean resources in open, market economies and weakens marketing coop-
eratives, especially when the right to exclude is attenuated. In Iceland, for ex-
ample, despite a long history of self-governance, dependence ofthe nation's econ-
omy on fisheries, and co-management, fish resources have been depleted
(Durrenberger and Palsson 1987). Similarly, in Turkey, overcapitalization and
overfishing resulted from competition among gear-oriented cooperatives and be-
tween commercial and sport fishing interests for non-exclusive fish resources
(Berkes 1986). However, although the whiting cooperative from New York Bight
failed to contract with other, competing fishermen (McCay 1980), it was not for a
lack of trying. Had the cooperative and other whiting fishermen owned usufruc-
tuary rights or territorial use rights, unitization might have resulted.'"* Or the
'^ Exclusion is part of territorial use rights fisheries, or TURFs (Christy 1982; Panayotou
1984); however, owners of a TURF area do not necessarily own de jure or even de facto
rights to the fish resources, particularly when they are mobile.
'^ There are cases, though, of traditional societies depleting some natural resources; see
Johannes (1978).
'" Even after the agreement was broken, the whiting cooperative continued to work to
contract with other whiting fishermen, including ship-to-ship radio calls to advertise the
benefits of restraint.2(4 S. F. Edwards
cooperative might have purchased usufructuary rights from other fishermen and
sought private ownership from the state.
Private Ownership
Soine time ago. Knight (1928: 163) remarked that "[i]t is in fact the social function
of [private] ownership to prevent . . . excessive investment in superior situa-
tions," where by superior situations he was referring to unowned farmland of
superior quality. Concerning this paper, "[i]f a fishery could be divided into
separate units and disposed of to private owners, if these rights could be freely
traded, if there would be enough separate owners to ensure competitive behavior,
and if the individual owners had enough knowledge and financing to manage their
holdings judiciously, then private ownership might suffice to prevent overfishing
and to ensure efficient use of the resource" (Crutchfield and Zellner 1963: 21).
Furthermore, by reducing the costs of contracting, private property rights should
facilitate transfers of resources to their most economically valuable uses or non-
uses (Alchian and Demsetz 1973; Cheung 1970; Coase 1960; Demsetz 1967). Re-
sidual claimants could invest resources more productively in market allocation to
commerce, recreation, or environmentalism than in rent-seeking. And although
future generations would not be singled out for special consideration, their de-
mands are factored into the expected capitalized value of a resource (Demsetz
1964).
Private property rights are also thought to internalize benefits and costs of an
activity (Alchian and Demsetz 1973; De Alessi 1980; Demsetz 1964, 1967), at least
to a degree. Demsetz (1964) described this possibility in terms of "tie-ins" and
"sales-in-combination," citing Coase's (1960) example of a railroad company,
whose trains spark fires in crops, buying contiguous farms. In fisheries, one can
imagine a commercial fishing corporation which leases or sells its alienable rights
to charter boat companies or to recreational fishermen. Such was the case in
England during the eighteenth century when aristocrats purchased the net rights
of commercial and subsistence salmon fishermen (McCay 1987). Similarly, con-
servation organizations might solicit funds to purchase usufructuary or ownership
rights in areas where marine mammals feed or mate. Baden and Stroup (1981)
described an analogous situation involving cattle grazing and oil production on the
Audubon Society's Rainey Wildlife Sanctuary in Louisiana. Finally, also conceiv-
able are companies which contract to internalize bycatch, or a company which
acquires ownership of fish resources in order to facilitate oil exploration and
production on outer continental shelf lands, possibly leasing usufructuary rights to
fishermen. That the Weyerhauser Corporation—primarily a timber products pro-
ducer—ventured into salmon farming in southern Oregon is illustrative (R. J.
Smith 1980).
These theoretical advantages of private ownership seem to be contingent on a
number of "ifs," though, as noted above. Furthermore, the transactions costs
involved with defining and enforcing ownership over renewable ocean resources
are still believed by many to preclude privatization. Yet, the issue is not whether
the ideal conditions for private ownership—or state ownership or common own-
ership—are perfectly met; of interest is a comparison of how the imperfections
affect the behavior of residual claimants and government stakeholders across
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fisheries should focus attention on its empirical requirements. Clearly, sessile,
nearshore, single-species resources, such as oysters, are most easily owned (Ag-
nello and Donnelley 1979). There are other cases, though. For example, in parts
of Mexico's Caribbean spiny lobster fishery, private territories have been delin-
eated in shallow bays (Miller 1989). Unlike in nearby open access zones, owners
of private territories invest in artificial lobster habitat which increases growth and
is thought to protect lobsters from predators. These lobster fishermen also adhere
to closed breeding seasons, police their territories, and, at times, lease access to
overlying waters to gillnetters. Similarly, a local processor monopsony in Western
Australia's Shark Bay and Exmouth Gulf prawn fisheries—which also owned
some of the limited entry fishing licenses—is credited with preventing overcapi-
talization and sustaining harvest and resource rents during the first 12 years of the
fishery (Meany 1979).
Although as a rule enforcement costs are likely to be high, exclusive, private
use of fur seals (Young 1981) and salmon (R. J. Smith 1980) illustrate that private
ownership of even fugitive ocean resources can be feasible and involves weighing
the expected benefits of exclusion and transfer against the costs of first negotiat-
ing contracts and then enforcing them (Agnello and Donnelley 1979; Cheung
1970).'^ Potential benefits are affected by shifts in relative prices and changes in
production and enforcement technology (Anderson and Hill 1975; Demsetz 1967).
For example, using trends in real prices and in technological change implicit in
catchability parameters of a bioeconomics model, Edwards and Murawski (1993)
estimated the potential resource rents from efficient harvest of New England
groundfish {e.g., Atlantic cod, haddock, and flounders) to be about $130 million
annually—a sizeable benefit. Also, some technologies to define and enforce pri-
vate property rights to renewable ocean resources are available. For example,
many lines are already "drawn" in the water, including the Extended Economic
Zones of coastal states and oil leases on continental shelves. Also, fish aggregat-
ing devises can be stationed or patrolled by boats (Christy 1982). In larger or
distant areas, helicopter patrols and satellite surveillance are conceivable.
On the cost side of the equation, both the geographic and, especially in multi-
species {e.g., groundfish) cases, ecological scales of exclusion would most likely
be quite large because of potential stock and fishing "externalities" discussed by
V. L. Smith (1969),'^ having a commensurate effect on enforcement costs.'^ In
my opinion, however, the most significant barriers to private property have been
the costs of negotiating contracts among literally thousands of residual claimants
from a divergent range of commercial, recreational, and environmental interests
and with government stakeholders.'^
'^ Several economists have proposed widespread, private ownership of fugitive resources
(Anderson and Leal 1991; Gardner 1983; R. L. Smith 1980; V. L. Smith 1982; Stroup and
Baden 1983). Other fugitive resources which have been assigned private rights include
groundwater (Wahl 1989) and oil pools (Libecap and Wiggins 1985).
'* Cheung (1970) dislikes the phrase, externality, because it implies something inherently
external to economic decision-makers. Externalities actually exist because the right to
contract is absent or transaction costs are too high.
'^ Cheung (1970) discussed ownership of entire fishing grounds. Similarly, Keen (1988)
envisions entire seaboards subject to private ownership.
'^ Jentoft (1989) and Johnson and Libecap (1982) emphasize the effects of heterogeneity on
contracting.266 S. F. Edwards
I wish to emphasize, though, that the utility-maximization model of decision-
making is no more an indictment of residual claimants and government stakehold-
ers than it is of consumers. Instead, its use in the property rights and public choice
paradigms is to explain how such individuals will satisfy personal preferences
subject to constraints on choices. Furthermore, the principal-agent problem exists
in regulated firms and firms with some market power, although apparently less
severe than in the public sector {e.g., Boardman and Vining 1989; De Alessi 1980).
Whether this more general comparative advantage holds in fisheries requires sep-
arate study, though, including the costs of exclusion in large scale, multi-species
fisheries.
Also, it is at least conceivable that some species might be extinguished by
conimercial or recreational exploiters when personal discount rates exceed bio-
logical or economic rates of growth (Clark 1973). Whether this is a problem for
fecund ocean fish resources is arguable, though. Furthermore, the extinction
argument overlooks legal options to attenuate fishing rights in an effort to pre-
serve species {e.g., the Marine Mammal Protection Act) or for conservation or-
ganizations to purchase usufructuary or ownership rights to marine mammals or
other vulnerable species from harvesters.
Finally, a third challenge to private ownership is deadweight losses resulting
from monopoly or monopsony market power. Gates (1988) reported, however,
that even the worst behavior by a monopsonist could cause less economic inef-
ficiency than which results under open access. Furthermore, the monopoly issue
also might be exaggerated, particularly when comparing the total opportunity
costs of alternative ownership institutions, as discussed above." For example,
Zeckhauser and Horn (1989) suggest that, given a choice between a state enter-
prise and a private firm with market power, the latter should be chosen because
inefficiencies resulting from the principal-agent problem would be less. Yet,
whether monopoly power would emerge from ownership of even vast areas offish
resources is unclear. Cheung (1970), for example, noted that private owners of
separate resources might compete with each other and/or importers in the mar-
ketplace. Furthermore, antitrust legislation might be used against lateral or ver-
tical integrations in the seafood sector.
The empirical possibility of private ownership of renewable ocean resources
needs reconsideration in light of dynamic demand, technological, and political
forces. It would be worthwhile to consider the species composition and areal
extent of renewable ocean resources for private ownership and the implications of
such units for market structure, competition, and enforcement costs. As for com-
mon ownership, private residual claimants are more likely to preserve resource
rents than are non-claimant, government stakeholders (Anderson and Hill 1983).
Furthermore, private ownership could internalize a not so insignificant part of
benefits and costs from use (or non-use) of renewable ocean resources and to
economize on allocation through market mechanisms. Nevertheless, the costs of
negotiating contracts among numerous dissimilar residual claimants and non-
claimants could be great.
'^ Perhaps a greater social concern is the possibility of monopsony power in local labor
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Conclusions
This foray into the property rights and public choice literatures raises several
research and policy questions regarding state ownership of renewable ocean re-
sources. Certainly in a static sense the economic costs of ITQs and other types of
state usufructuary rights policies have been underestimated because the costs of
rent-seeking and principal-agent problems in government are not counted. Nev-
ertheless, do state usufructuary rights improve efficiency in the economy when
compared to traditional government regulations on harvest and fishing effort?
Possibly, given gains in the technical efficiency of fieets; however, it is important
to realize that actual usufructuary rights policies typically attenuate even these
limited rights by restricting use and transfer and/or by making tenure and exclu-
sion uncertain.^^ Furthermore, state usufructuary rights policies could increase
the scope for dissipation of resource rents because the benefits they create are
subject to rent-seeking and because government agencies could use the existence
of resource rents as part of the rationale for agency growth. I am not aware of a
comprehensive, ex post assessment of the relative benefits and costs of ITQ
programs which includes the costs of rent-seeking and the principal-agent prob-
lem.
Regardless of whether they are likely to promote efficiency in static compar-
isons, though, economic evaluations of state usufructuary rights could advance to
a few dynamic considerations. First, state usufructuary policies appear to be a
good way for resource conserving residual claimants to gain a foothold and begin
to contract with the state and each other for more complete rights, namely man-
agement, exclusion, and alienation. The anecdotal evidence thus far of contract-
ing for research, management, and enforcement in New Zealand's abalone and
orange roughy ITQ fisheries (Pearse and Waters 1992; Scott 1993) is a promising
step toward common or private ownership.
Similarly, how might specific usufructuary rights policies affect evolution to
common or private ownership, or, from an obviously normative point of view,
how might state usufructuary rights be designed to facilitate such change? Al-
though Scott (1988, 1993) sees a natural progression from ITQs to private prop-
erty, other economists {e.g., Johnson and Libecap 1982; Libecap 1986) and an-
thropologists {e.g., McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 1987) are skeptical, citing
impasses that can arise whenever wealth will be redistributed. Thus, not only is
institutional change incremental, but it depends on the extant distribution of prop-
erty and rights (Libecap 1989). Both the forces which shape state usufructuary
policies and the characteristics which facilitate or weaken further contracting
might be learned from field studies of limited entry, ITQ, and co-management
programs.
Also, property rights theory and empirical comparisons of private enterprise
with other forms of economic organization rank private ownership as most effi-
cient. However, would contracting for private property rights to renewable ocean
^° In the United States, fishery management plans which control access usually place limits
on transfer and concentration of the usufructuary right and include other, traditional man-
agement measures which the fishing industry does not necessarily agree with. Also, the
Councils tend to create indefinite rights, not permanent rights.268 S. F. Edwards
resources (if it happens at all) completely dissipate resource rents over time? As
noted above, Anderson and Hill (1983) argue from both theory and observation of
the U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management that total
dissipation is likely when utility-maximizing stakeholders in government control
use of natural resources. That is, the costs of defining and enforcing property
rights, including rent-seeking as well as transaction costs, are augmented by the
behavior of utility-maximizing government stakeholders when the principal-agent
problem is significant. The limits to contracting—numerous and heterogeneous
claimants and non-claimants, information problems, and redistribution of wealth
(Libecap 1989)—are extreme in many of the world's ocean fisheries, especially
where endangered species of marine mammals or sea turtles are bycatch. Whether
the process of privatizing renewable ocean resources contributes to efficiency
over time is another empirical question worthy of research.
Finally, the generic discussion of ownership institutions in this paper could be
vastly improved by comparative analyses of specific types of economic organi-
zations, how they match resource characteristics, and how they relate to market
strtlcture. State enterprise (Young 1981), marketing cooperatives (McCay 1980),
and processor-monopsony (Meany 1979) are a few real world fisheries examples.
Such comparative analyses might also address confusion about the implications of
market structure and competition for efficiency. For example. Comes et al. (1986)
reported that an efficient optimum would require more than one firm to exploit a
common fish pool when output is sold in an imperfectly competitive market. In
contrast, Munro (1982) showed the comparative benefit of a bilateral monopoly
when a processor-monopsonist and harvest-monopolist contract side payments.
However, neither theoretical study incorporated rent-seeking, the principal-agent
problem, contracting costs, or legal impediments as costs or constraints—all fac-
tors which can not be omitted when discussing the economic efficiency of own-
ership of renewable ocean resources.
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